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The price guarantee is widely used in the real life. retail giants like Wat-
son, Wal Mart, Carrefour often make ”low price guarantee”, ”price differ-
ence return” commitment to attract consumers. The two main forms of price
guarantee are price matchin guarantee and price beating guarantee. Their
roles and impact on the market has been in the academic dispute: improv-
ing competition or faciliating collusion. This paper studys from sellers and
consumers’ aspects respectively. By the study of two Bertrand models (com-
pletely substitution and partly substitution) in symmetric market (the same
cost) and asymmetric market (different costs), we find that although price
matching guarantee may generate some competitive results, it is more biased
to promote the collusion in essence. While the role of price beating strategy
in promoting competition is much more obvious. Under the different market
characteristics, each party’s preference for these two strategies is also different.
When parties are evenly matched, choosing price matching strategy to achieve
collusive equilibrium is a wise choice for both. while if the cost advantage
is obvious, the more aggressive pricing strategy (price beating strategy) can
better play with cost advantage to fight against the interests of the opponent.
Considering from the point of view of consumers, we study the impact of the
price guarantee policy on consumers in the ”online shopping” and ”bricks and
mortar” respectively. We find that shopping environment plays an important
role for the effect of the price guarantee policy. Compared with the brick and
mortar environment, price matching policy and price beating policy are more
effective in the online shopping case. And in brick and mortar environment,
the higher penalty level leads to lower credibility of policy itself. the com-
parison between the price matching policy and price beating policy shows the
cognitive difference between the two of consumers is not obvious.



















1.1 研究背景 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 研究内容 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 研究意义 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 本文内容和框架 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 国内外相关研究文献综述 5
2.1 价格匹配策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 价格对抗策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 实验方法研究价差补偿策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4 对价差补偿策略的实证研究 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5 从消费者视角看价差补偿策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 价格补偿策略的理论模型分析 9
3.1 模型及均衡推导 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1 情形 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.2 情形 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.3 情形 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.4 情形 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 从模型分析结果看价差补偿策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.1 价格匹配策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.2 价格对抗策略 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.3 小结 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 对价差补偿策略的补充研究 37
4.1 获得-交易效用理论 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 研究假设 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2.1 价格调查 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38















4.2.3 索要价差补偿的意愿和政策可信度 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3 研究方法 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3.1 研究设计 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3.2 分析方法 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4 数据分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4.1 信度分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4.2 假设检验 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.5 讨论和本章小结 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5 结论 49
5.1 研究结论 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2 研究意义 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

























1.1 Background and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Literature Review 5
2.1 Price Matching Guarantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Price Beating Guarantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Experiment Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4 Empirical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5 Consumer Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Theoretical Analysis 9
3.1 Model and Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1 Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.2 Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.3 Case 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.4 Case 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Result Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.1 Price Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.2 Price Beating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 Compliment Survey Research 37
4.1 Acquisition - Transaction Utility Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2.1 Price Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38















4.2.3 Rebate - Requiring and Policy Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3 Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3.1 Design of Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3.2 Statisitic Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4.1 Reliability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4.2 Hypothesis Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.5 Discussion and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5 Conclusion 49
5.1 Achievement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2 Value of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50















































































的商店商品价格水平的映象（Jain 和 Srivastava ，2000），购买倾向和发现低价索
要价差退返的意愿等（Kukar-Kinney和 Grewal，2007）；二是它们会改变消费者对






























































































补偿策略（price matching policy）、价差补偿承诺（price matching guarantee）等，
它们的涵义基本上是一致的。
依据承诺价差退返的程度，价差补偿策略可分为价格匹配（Price-matching ）
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